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What motivated the US to go to war with Great Britain

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This article is nigh the Anglo-American War of 1812 to 1815. For Napoleon's invasion of Russian federation, see French invasion of Russia.

The origins of the War of 1812 (1812-1815), between the United states and the British Empire and its First Nation allies, have been long debated. There were multiple factors that caused the United states of america declaration of war on United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland:[one]

  • A serial of merchandise restrictions introduced past United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland to impede American trade with French republic with which Britain was at war (the U.s. contested the restrictions equally illegal under international law).[2]
  • The impressment (forced recruitment) of seamen on US vessels into the Royal Navy (the British claimed that they were British deserters).
  • The British military support for American Indians who were offer armed resistance to the expansion of the American frontier to the Northwest Territory.
  • A possible desire by the US to annex some or all of Canada.[iii]
  • Implicit but powerful was a United states of america motivation and desire to uphold national honor in the face up of what they considered to exist British insults, such as the Chesapeake affair.[4]

American expansion into the Northwest Territory (now Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and northeast Minnesota) was impeded by Indian raids. Some historians maintain that an American goal in the state of war was to annex some or all of Canada, a view that many Canadians still share. Withal, many argue that inducing the fear of such a seizure was merely an American tactic, which was designed to obtain a bargaining scrap.[5]

Some members of the British Parliament[half dozen] and dissident American politicians such as John Randolph of Roanoke[7] claimed that American expansionism, rather than maritime disputes, was the chief motivation for the American proclamation of war. That view has been retained by some historians.[eight]

Although the British made some concessions before the war on neutral trade, they insisted on the right to reclaim their deserting sailors. The British too had long had a goal to create a large "neutral" Indian state that would embrace much of Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan. They fabricated the need as late as 1814 at the Ghent Peace Conference but had lost battles that would have validated those claims.[9] [ten]

The war was fought in four theatres: on the oceans, where the warships and privateers of both sides preyed on each other'due south merchant shipping; along the Atlantic Declension of the The states, which was blockaded with increasing severity by the British, who also mounted big-scale raids in the after stages of the state of war; on the long frontier, running along the Groovy Lakes and Saint Lawrence River, which separated the US from Upper Canada and Lower Canada (at present Ontario and Quebec); and along the declension of the Gulf of Mexico.

During the war, both Americans and British launched invasions of each other's territory, all of which either failed or gained only temporary success. At the end of the war, the British held American territory in parts of Maine and some outposts in the sparsely-populated West, and the Americans held Canadian territory about Detroit. However, all territories that were occupied past either side were restored at the peace treaty to the prewar borders.

In the Us, battles such as New Orleans and Baltimore, the latter of which inspired the lyrics of the United states national canticle, The Star-Spangled Banner, produced a sense of euphoria over a Second War of Independence against Britain and ushered in an Era of Good Feelings. The partisan animosity that had once verged on treason practically vanished.

Canada also emerged from the war with a heightened sense of national feeling and solidarity against the American invasion.

United kingdom, which had regarded the state of war as a sideshow to the Napoleonic Wars, which had raged in Europe, was less afflicted by the fighting, and its government and people welcomed an era of peaceful relations with the US.

British goals [edit]

The British Empire was engaged in a life-and-death war against Napoleon and could not let the Americans to help the enemy, regardless of their lawful neutral rights to do so. As Horsman explained, "If possible, England wished to avert war with America, but non to the extent of allowing her to hinder the British war endeavor against France. Moreover... a large department of influential British opinion, both in the government and in the country, thought that America presented a threat to British maritime supremacy."[11]

The British had two goals.

Defeating Napoleon [edit]

All parties were committed to the defeat of France, which required sailors and thus impressment, as well as all-out commercial war confronting France, which caused the restrictions that were imposed on American merchant ships. On the question of trade with America, the British parties carve up. Every bit Horsman argues, "Some restrictions on neutral commerce were essential for England in this catamenia. That this restriction took such an extreme class after 1807 stemmed not but from the endeavor to defeat Napoleon, but besides from the undoubted jealousy of America'southward commercial prosperity that existed in England. America was unfortunate in that for most of the flow from 1803 to 1812 political power in England was held by a grouping that was pledged not merely to the defeat of France, but likewise to a rigid maintenance of Great britain's commercial supremacy."[12] That group was weakened past Whigs friendly to the Us in mid-1812, and the policies were reversed although the US had already alleged war. By 1815, Britain was no longer controlled past politicians dedicated to commercial supremacy and so that cause had vanished.

The British were hindered by weakened diplomats in Washington, such as David Erskine, who were unable to represent a consistent British policy, and past communications that were and so slow the Americans did not learn of the reversal of policy until they had declared war.

Americans proposed a truce based on the British ending impressment, simply the latter refused because they needed those sailors. Horsman explained, "Impressment, which was the principal point of contention between England and America from 1803 to 1807, was made necessary primarily because of England'due south great shortage of seamen for the war against Napoleon. In a similar fashion the restrictions on American commerce imposed by England's Orders in Quango, which were the supreme cause of complaint between 1807 and 1812, were one function of a vast commercial struggle being waged between England and France."[12]

Cosmos of Indian barrier country between United states and Canada [edit]

The British also had the long-standing goal of creating an Indian barrier country, a large "neutral" Indian country that would cover about of the Erstwhile Northwest to be a barrier between the Western US and Canada. It would be independent of the US and under the tutelage of the British, who would use it to cake American expansionism and to build up their command of the fur trade.[13]

The British connected to make that need every bit late every bit 1814, during the Ghent Peace Conference. However, they dropped the demand since their position had been weakened by the collapse of Tecumseh's Confederacy after the Battle of the Thames. Too, they simply no longer considered the goal to exist worth war against the U.s. although much of the proposed buffer country had remained largely under British and Indian command throughout the state of war.[9] [14]

American goals [edit]

There were several firsthand stated causes for the American declaration of war:

  • A serial of trade restrictions, the Orders in Quango (1807), were introduced by Britain to impede American trade with France, which was at state of war with Britain. The U.s. contested those restrictions as illegal under international law.[2]
  • The impressment (forced recruitment) of U.s. citizens into the Royal Navy.
  • The British military support for American Indians, who were offering armed resistance to the US.[3]
  • An unstated simply powerful motivation past the US was the need that was felt to uphold national award in the face of British insults, such equally the Chesapeake affair.[four]
  • A possible United states desire to addendum Canada.

British support for Indian raids [edit]

Indians based in the Northwest Territory, at present usa of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, had organized in opposition to American settlement and were being supplied with weapons by British traders in Canada. Britain was non trying to provoke a war and, at one bespeak, cut its allocations of gunpowder to the tribes, but information technology was trying to build up its fur trade and friendly relations with potential armed forces allies.[xv] Britain had ceded the area to the United States in the Treaty of Paris (1783) but had the long-term goal of creating a "neutral" or buffer Indian state in the surface area to block further American growth.[xvi] The Indian nations generally followed Tenskwatawa, the Shawnee Prophet and the brother of Tecumseh. Since 1805, he had preached his vision of purifying his guild past expelling the "Children of the Evil Spirit" (the American settlers).[17]

According to Pratt,

There is aplenty proof that the British authorities did all in their power to hold or win the allegiance of the Indians of the Northwest with the expectation of using them as allies in the event of war. Indian allegiance could exist held but by gifts, and to an Indian no gift was every bit acceptable as a lethal weapon. Guns and ammunition, tomahawks and scalping knives were dealt out with some liberality by British agents.[18] Raiding grew more common in 1810 and 1811. Westerners in Congress institute the raids intolerable and wanted them to be permanently ended.[nineteen] [20]

American expansionism [edit]

Historians accept considered the idea that American expansionism was one crusade of the war. The American expansion into the Northwest Territory (now Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin) was beingness blocked by Indians, which was a major cause animative the Westerners. The American historian Walter Nugent, in his history of American expansionism, argues that expansion into the Midwest "was not the only American objective, and indeed not the firsthand one surface area but information technology was an objective."[21]

Looting [edit]

More controversial is whether an American state of war goal was to learn Canadian lands, especially what is now Western Ontario, permanently or whether it was planned to seize the area temporarily as a bargaining chip. The American desire for Canada has been a staple in Canadian public opinion since the 1830s and was much discussed amid historians earlier 1940 only has since become less popular. The idea was kickoff developed by the Marxist historian Louis M. Hacker and refined by the diplomatic specialist Julius Pratt.[22]

In 1925, Pratt argued that Western Americans were incited to state of war by the prospect of seizing Canada.[23] Pratt's argument supported the belief of many Canadians, especially in Ontario, where fear of American expansionism was a major political element, and the notion still survives among Canadians.[24]

United States 1812-05-1812-06.png

In 2010, the American historian Alan Taylor examined the political dimension of the annexation issue as Congress debated whether to declare war in 1811 and 1812. The Federalist Party was strongly opposed to war and to annexation, as were the Northeastern states. The majority in Congress was held by the Autonomous-Republican Party, which was dissever on the issue. One faction wanted the permanent expulsion of United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland and the annexation of Canada. John Randolph of Roanoke, representing Virginia, commented, "Agrestal greed not maritime correct urges this war. We take heard but one word - like the whipporwill's one monotonous tone: Canada! Canada! Canada!"[25]

The other faction, based in the South, said that acquiring new territory in the North would requite information technology likewise much power and and then opposed the incorporation of Canada since its Catholic population was viewed as "unfit by faith, linguistic communication and illiteracy for republican citizenship." The Senate held a series of debates and twice voted on proposals that explicitly endorsed annexation, neither of which passed. Nonetheless, the second failed only because of a proviso stating that Canada could be returned to British rule after it had been annexed. War was alleged with no mention of annexation, but widespread back up existed among the War Hawks for information technology. Some Southerners supported expansionism; Tennessee Senator Felix Grundy considered it essential to acquire Canada to preserve domestic political balance and argued that annexing Canada would maintain the free state-slave state balance, which might otherwise exist ended past the acquisition of Florida and the settlement of the southern areas of the new Louisiana Buy.[26]

Even James Monroe and Henry Clay, key officials in the government, expected to proceeds at least Upper Canada from a successful war.

American commanders like Full general William Hull and Alexander Smythe issued proclamations to Canadians and their troops that assured them that annexations would actually occur during the war. Smythe wrote to his troops that when they entered Canada, "Y'all enter a land that is to become one with the United States. You will arrive among a people who are to become your fellow-citizens."[27]

Seizing Canada as bargaining fleck [edit]

Historians now more often than not hold that an invasion and seizure of Canada was the main American military strategy once the war had begun. With British control of the oceans, at that place was no other way to fight against British interests actively. President James Madison believed that food supplies from Canada were essential to the British overseas empire in the West Indies and that an American seizure would be an fantabulous bargaining chip at the peace briefing. During the war, some Americans speculated that they might as well keep all of Canada. Thomas Jefferson, for example, was now out of power but argued that the expulsion of British interests from nearby Canada would remove a long-term threat to American republicanism.

The New Zealander historian J.C.A. Stagg argued that Madison and his advisers believed that the conquest of Canada would exist piece of cake and that economic coercion would force the British to come up to terms by cutting off the food supply for their highly-valuable West Indies sugar colonies. Furthermore, the possession of Canada would be a valuable bargaining chip. Stagg suggested that frontiersmen demanded the seizure of Canada non considering they wanted the state, since they had enough of it, merely because the British were thought to exist arming the Indians and thus blocked settlement of the Westward.[28]

As Horsman concluded, "The idea of conquering Canada had been present since at least 1807 as a means of forcing England to alter her policy at bounding main. The conquest of Canada was primarily a means of waging war, not a reason for starting it."[29] Hickey flatly stated, "The desire to annex Canada did not bring on the war."[thirty] Brown (1964) ended, "The purpose of the Canadian expedition was to serve negotiation not to addendum Canada."[31]

Burt, a Canadian scholar simply besides a professor at an American academy, agreed completely by noting that Foster, the British minister to Washington, as well rejected the statement that annexation of Canada was a state of war goal.[32] However, Foster also rejected the possibility of a declaration of war only had dinner with several of the more prominent War Hawks and then his sentence on such matters can be questioned.

However, Stagg stated that "had the State of war 1812 been a successful war machine venture, the Madison administration would take been reluctant to have returned occupied Canadian territory to the enemy."[33] Other authors concur, with one stating, "Expansion was not the merely American objective, and indeed non the immediate i. Simply it was an objective."[34]

"The American yearning to absorb Canada was long-standing.... In 1812 it became part of a grand strategy."[35]

Another suggested, "Americans harbored 'manifest destiny' ideas of Canadian annexation throughout the nineteenth century." [36] A third stated, "The [American] belief that the United States would one day addendum Canada had a continuous existence from the early days of the War of Independence to the War of 1812 [and] was a factor of chief importance in bringing on the state of war."[37]

Another stated that "acquiring Canada would satisfy America'southward expansionist desires"[38]

The historian Spencer Tucker wrote, "War Hawks were eager to wage war with the British, not only to stop Indian depredations in the Midwest merely as well to seize Canada and maybe Spanish Florida."[39]

Inhabitants of Ontario [edit]

Virtually of the inhabitants of Upper Canada (at present Ontario) were Americans, merely some of them were exiled United Empire Loyalists, and near of them were recent immigrants. The Loyalists were extremely hostile to American annexation, and the other settlers seem to have been uninterested and to have remained neutral during the war. The Canadian colonies were thinly populated and only lightly defended past the British Army, and some Americans believed that the many in Upper Canada would rise and greet the American invading ground forces as liberators.[forty] The combination implied an easy conquest. Once the war began, ex-President Thomas Jefferson warned that the British presence posed a grave threat and pointed to "The infamous intrigues of Great Great britain to destroy our government... and with the Indians to Tomahawk our women and children, prove that the cession of Canada, their fulcrum for these Machiavellian levers, must be a sine qua non at a treaty of peace." He predicted in belatedly 1812 that "the acquisition of Canada this twelvemonth, as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere thing of marching, and will give us the feel for the assail on Halifax, the next and concluding expulsion of England from the American continent."[41]

Maass argued in 2015 that the expansionist theme is a myth that goes confronting the "relative consensus amidst experts that the primary U.S. objective was the repeal of British maritime restrictions." He argued the consensus amidst scholars to exist that the US went to war "considering vi years of economic sanctions had failed to bring Uk to the negotiating table, and threatening the Royal Navy'due south Canadian supply base was their last promise." Yet, he also noted that many historians withal published expansionism as a cause and that fifty-fifty those against the thought notwithstanding included caveats regarding "possible expansionism underlying The states motives." Maass agreed that theoretically, expansionism might take tempted Americans, but he likewise found that "leaders feared the domestic political consequences of doing and then. Notably, what express expansionism in that location was focused on sparsely populated western lands rather than the more populous eastern settlements [of Canada]."[42]

Violations of US rights [edit]

The long wars between United kingdom and French republic (1793–1815) led to repeated complaints by the US that both powers violated American rights, as a neutral power, to trade with both sides. Furthermore, Americans complained loudly that British agents in Canada were supplying munitions to hostile Native American tribes living in US territories.

In the mid-1790s, the Regal Navy, brusk of manpower, began to board American merchant ships to seize American and British sailors from American vessels. Although the policy of impressment was supposed to repossess only British subjects, the police of United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland and most other countries defined nationality by birth. However, American law allowed individuals who had been resident in the country for some time to adopt US citizenship. Therefore, many individuals were British by British police but American by American constabulary. The defoliation was compounded by the refusal of Jefferson and Madison to issue any official citizenship documents. Their position was that all persons serving on American ships were to be regarded equally US citizens and so no further evidence was required. That stance was motivated past the advice of Albert Gallatin, who had calculated that half of the US deep-sea merchant seamen (ix,000 men) were British subjects. Allowing the Royal Navy to repossess those men would destroy both the US economy and the government'due south vital customs revenue.[43] Any sort of accommodation would jeopardize those men and then concords such as the proposed Monroe-Pinkney Treaty (1806) betwixt the US and United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland were rejected by Jefferson.

To fill the need for some sort of identification, US consuls provided unofficial papers. Nonetheless, they relied on unverifiable declarations by the private concerned for evidence of citizenship, and the big fees paid for the documents made them a lucrative sideline. In plow, British officers, who were curt of personnel and convinced, somewhat reasonably, that the American flag was covering a large number of British deserters, tended to treat such papers with contemptuousness. Between 1806 and 1812, most 6,000 seamen were impressed and taken against their will into the Royal Navy;[44] 3,800 of them were later released.[45]

Accolade [edit]

A number of American contemporaries chosen it "the "Second War for Independence."[46] Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun pushed a annunciation of war through Congress by stressing the need to uphold American honor and independence. Speaking of his swain Southerners, Calhoun told Congress that they

are not prepared for the colonial state to which once again that Power [Great Britain] is endeavoring to reduce us. The manly spirit of that section of our country will not submit to be regulated by whatever strange Power.[47]

The historian Norman Risjord emphasized the central importance of honor as a cause the war.[48] Americans of every political stripe saw the need to uphold national honour and to reject the treatment of the United States by United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland as a third-grade nonentity. Americans talked incessantly about the need for force in response.[49] That quest for honor was a major cause of the war in the sense that nearly Americans who were not involved in mercantile interests or threatened by Indian assail strongly endorsed the preservation of national honor.[50]

The humiliating assail by HMS Leopard against USS Chesapeake in June 1807 was a decisive event.[51] [52] Many Americans called for war, only Jefferson held back and insisted that economic warfar would prove more successful, which he initiated, especially in the class of embargoing or refusing to sell products to Britain. The policy proved a failure by not deterring the British, but it seriously damaged American industry and alienated the mercantile cities of the Northeast, which were seriously hurt.

Historians take demonstrated the powerful motive of honor to shape public opinion in a number of states, including Massachusetts,[53] Ohio,[54] Pennsylvania,[55] [56] Tennessee,[57] and Virginia,[58] besides every bit the territory of Michigan.[59] On 3 June 1812, the Firm Committee on Foreign Affairs, chaired past the pro-war extremist John C. Calhoun, called for a proclamation of war in ringing phrases by denouncing Britain's "animalism for power," "unbounded tyranny," and "mad ambition." James Roark wrote, "These were fighting words in a war that was in big measure out about insult and honor."[lx] Calhoun reaped much of the credit.[61]

In terms of honour, the conclusion of the war, peculiarly the spectacular defeat of the main British invasion army at New Orleans, restored the American sense of honor. The historian Lance Banning wrote:

National honor, the reputation of republican government, and the continuing supremacy of the Republican party had seemed to be at stake.... National honor had [now] been satisfied.... Americans historic the finish of the struggle with a vivid flare-up of national pride. They felt that they had fought a second war for independence, and had won. If piddling had been gained, nothing had been lost in a contest the greatest royal power on the earth.[62]

According to J.C.A. Stagg, a historian from New Zealand,

Initially, in the studies of Norman Risjord, these values were described as an outrageous sense of "national honor" provoked by the conduct of Great britain toward the The states on the high seas, but in the piece of work of Roger Dark-brown, concerns about "national honor" became role of a larger delivery to "republicanism" itself—both in the institution of the ruling Jeffersonian Republican Party and in the conventionalities that republicanism as a national creed would be in jeopardy unless Americans made another attempt to vindicate the independence that had supposedly been won in 1783.[63]

The states economic motivations [edit]

The failure of Jefferson'southward embargo and of Madison's economic coercion, according to Horsman, "made war or accented submission to England the merely alternatives, and the latter presented more terrors to the recent colonists. The war hawks came from the West and the Southward, regions that had supported economic warfare and were suffering the most from British restrictions at bounding main. The merchants of New England earned large profits from the wartime carrying trade, in spite of the numerous captures by both France and England, but the western and southern farmers, who looked longingly at the export marketplace, were suffering a depression that fabricated them demand war."[64]

Prewar incidents [edit]

This dispute came to the forefront with the Chesapeake–Leopard affair of 1807, when the British warship HMS Leopard fired on and boarded the American warship USS Chesapeake, killed three, and carried off four deserters from the Royal Navy. (Merely one was a British citizen and was later hanged; the other three were American citizens and were later on returned but the last two only in 1812.) The American public was outraged by the incident, and many called for state of war to affirm American sovereignty and national honor.

The Chesapeake–Leopard affair followed closely on the similar Leander affair, which had resulted in Jefferson banning certain British warships and their captains from American ports and waters. Whether in response to that incident or the Chesapeake-Leopard affair, Jefferson banned all foreign armed vessels from American waters except for those bearing dispatches. In December 1808, an American officer expelled HMS Sandwich from Savannah, Georgia; the schooner had entered with dispatches for the British consul there.

Meanwhile, Napoleon'south Continental Arrangement (1806) and the British Orders in Council (1807) established embargoes that made international trade precarious. From 1807 to 1812, almost 900 American ships were seized every bit a result.[65] The US responded with the Embargo Act of 1807, which prohibited American ships from sailing to any foreign ports and airtight American ports to British ships. Jefferson's embargo was especially unpopular in New England, whose merchants preferred the indignities of impressment to the halting of overseas commerce. The discontent contributed to the calling of the Hartford Convention in 1814.

The Embargo Human action had no result on either Britain or French republic and so was replaced past the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, which lifted all embargoes on American shipping except for those bound for British or French ports. As that proved to be unenforceable, it was replaced in 1810 by Macon's Bill Number two, which lifted all embargoes simply offered that if France or Great britain ceased its interference with American shipping, the US would reinstate an embargo on the other nation. Napoleon, seeing an opportunity to brand trouble for Britain, promised to leave American ships alone, and the US reinstated the embargo with Britain and moved closer to declaring state of war. Notwithstanding, he had no intention of honoring his promise.[66]

Exacerbating the state of affairs, Sauk Indians, who controlled merchandise on the Upper Mississippi, were displeased with the US government after the 1804 treaty between Quashquame and William Henry Harrison ceded Sauk territory in Illinois and Missouri to the U.s.a.. The Sauk felt the treaty to be unjust and that Quashquame had been unauthorized to sign abroad country and had been unaware of what he was signing. The establishment of Fort Madison in 1808 on the Mississippi had further angered the Sauk and led many, including Black Hawk, to side with the British before the war broke out. Sauk and centrolineal Indians, including the Ho-Clamper (Winnebago), were very effective fighters for the British on the Mississippi and helped to defeat Fort Madison and Fort McKay in Prairie du Chien.

The Oxford historian Paul Langford looked at the decisions by the British authorities in 1812:

The British ambassador in Washington [Erskine] brought affairs almost to an adaptation, and was ultimately disappointed not past American intransigence but past one of the outstanding diplomatic blunders fabricated by a Foreign Secretarial assistant. It was Canning who, in his most irresponsible mode and apparently out of sheer dislike of everything American, recalled the ambassador Erskine and wrecked the negotiations, a piece of nigh gratis folly. As a result, the possibility of a new embarrassment for Napoleon turned into the certainty of a much more serious one for his enemy. Though the British cabinet eventually made the necessary concessions on the score of the Orders-in-Council, in response to the pressures of industrial lobbying at dwelling, its activeness came likewise tardily.... The loss of the North American markets could accept been a decisive blow. As it was by the time the United States declared war, the Continental System [of Napoleon] was beginning to crack, and the danger correspondingly diminishing. Even so, the state of war, inconclusive though it proved in a armed services sense, was an deadening and expensive embarrassment which British statesman could have done much more to avert.[67]

Declaration of state of war [edit]

In the U.s.a. House of Representatives, a group of young Democratic-Republicans, known equally the "War Hawks," came to the forefront in 1811 and were led by Speaker Henry Clay of Kentucky and by John C. Calhoun of South Carolina. They advocated going to war against Britain for all of the reasons listed higher up only concentrated on their grievances more than on territorial expansion.

On ane June 1812, President James Madison gave a speech to the Usa Congress that recounted American grievances against Britain but did non specifically call for a annunciation of war. Afterwards Madison's spoken language, the Business firm of Representatives rapidly voted (79 to 49) to declare state of war, and the Senate did the aforementioned by 19 to 13. The conflict formally began on 18 June 1812, when Madison signed the measure out into police. It was the start time that the US had declared war on another nation, and the congressional vote was the closest-ever vote to declare state of war in American history. None of the 39 Federalists in Congress voted for the war, whose critics later referred to it as "Mr. Madison'southward War." [68]

See also [edit]

  • Chronology of the War of 1812
  • Presidency of Thomas Jefferson
  • Presidency of James Madison
  • Opposition to the War of 1812
  • Results of the War of 1812
  • State of war of 1812
  • State of war of 1812 bibliography

References [edit]

  1. ^ Jasper Chiliad. Trautsch, "The Causes of the State of war of 1812: 200 Years of Debate," Journal of Military History (January 2013) 77#1 pp. 273-293.
  2. ^ a b Caffery, pp. 56–58
  3. ^ a b Caffery, pp. 101–104
  4. ^ a b Norman K. Risjord, "1812: Conservatives, War Hawks, and the Nation's Honor." William And Mary Quarterly 1961 18(two): 196–210. in JSTOR
  5. ^ Bowler, pp. 11–32
  6. ^ George Canning, Address respecting the war with America, Hansard (House of Commons), 18 Feb 1813
  7. ^ Fregosi, Paul (1989). Dreams of Empire. Hutchinson. p. 328. ISBN0-09-173926-8.
  8. ^ J. C. A. Stagg (1983), Mr Madison's War, p. 4
  9. ^ a b Dwight L. Smith, "A N American Neutral Indian Zone: Persistence of a British Thought" Northwest Ohio Quarterly 1989 61(two–4): 46–63
  10. ^ Francis Yard. Carroll, A Good and Wise Measure: The Search for the Canadian-American Boundary, 1783–1842, 2001, p. 23
  11. ^ Horsman (1962) p. 264
  12. ^ a b Horsman (1962) p. 265
  13. ^ Dwight Fifty. Smith"A North American Neutral Indian Zone: Persistence of a British Thought." Northwest Ohio Quarterly 61#two-four (1989): 46-63.
  14. ^ Francis Chiliad. Carroll (2001). A Good and Wise Measure: The Search for the Canadian-American Boundary, 1783-1842 . U. of Toronto Printing. p. 24.
  15. ^ Mark Zuehlke, For Honour's Sake: The War of 1812 and the Brokering of an Uneasy Peace (2006) pp. 62–62
  16. ^ Dwight L. Smith, "A Northward American Neutral Indian Zone: Persistence of a British Idea", Northwest Ohio Quarterly (1989) 61 (ii–four): 46–63.
  17. ^ Timothy D. Willig. Restoring the Chain of Friendship: British Policy and the Indians of the Bang-up Lakes, 1783–1815 (2008) p. 207.
  18. ^ Julius W. Pratt, A history of U.s. foreign-policy (1955) p 126
  19. ^ David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, eds. Encyclopedia of the War of 1812 (1997) pp. 253, 504
  20. ^ Zuehlke, For Accolade's Sake, p 62
  21. ^ Walter Nugent, Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansionism (2009), ch. iii, quoted on p. 73.
  22. ^ Hacker (1924); Pratt (1925). Goodman (1941) refuted the idea, and even Pratt gave information technology up. Pratt (1955)
  23. ^ Julius W. Pratt, "Western Aims in the State of war of 1812." The Mississippi Valley Historical Review (1925): 36-fifty. in JSTOR
  24. ^ W. Arthur Bowler, "Propaganda in Upper Canada in the War of 1812," American Review of Canadian Studies (1988) 28:11–32; C.P. Stacey, "The War of 1812 in Canadian History" in Morris Zaslow and Wesley B. Turner, eds. The Dedicated Border: Upper Canada and the War of 1812 (Toronto, 1964)
  25. ^ Fregosi 1989, p. 328.
  26. ^ John Roderick Heller (2010). Democracy's Lawyer: Felix Grundy of the Former Southwest. p. 98.
  27. ^ Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish gaelic Rebels, & Indian Allies (2010) pp. 137-forty.
  28. ^ Stagg (1983)
  29. ^ Horsman (1962) p. 267
  30. ^ Hickey (1990) p. 72.
  31. ^ Brownish p. 128.
  32. ^ Burt (1940) pp. 305–310.
  33. ^ Stagg 1983, p. four. sfn error: no target: CITEREFStagg1983 (help)
  34. ^ Nugent, p. 73. sfn mistake: no target: CITEREFNugent (help)
  35. ^ Nugent, p. 75. sfn error: no target: CITEREFNugent (assist)
  36. ^ Carlisle & Golson 2007, p. 44. sfn fault: no target: CITEREFCarlisleGolson2007 (help)
  37. ^ Pratt 1925, p.[ page needed ]. sfn mistake: no target: CITEREFPratt1925 (assist)
  38. ^ David Heidler,Jeanne T. Heidler, The State of war of 1812, pg4[ full commendation needed ]
  39. ^ Tucker 2011, p. 236. sfn error: no target: CITEREFTucker2011 (assist)
  40. ^ Fred Landon, Western Ontario and the American Borderland (1941) pp 12–22
  41. ^ James Laxer (2012). Tecumseh and Brock: The War of 1812. p. 129.
  42. ^ Richard W. Maass, "Difficult to Relinquish Territory Which Had Been Conquered": Expansionism and the War of 1812," Diplomatic History (Jan 2015) 39#i pp 70-97 doi: 10.1093/dh/dht132 Abstract Online
  43. ^ Rodger, Control of the Ocean, p565
  44. ^ Hickey (1989) p. 11
  45. ^ Rodger, Command of the Ocean, p566
  46. ^ Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty (2008) vol i p 270.
  47. ^ William Thou. Meigs, The Life of John Caldwell Calhoun (1917) one:126.
  48. ^ Norman K. Risjord, "1812: Conservatives, War Hawks and the Nation'due south Laurels." William and Mary Quarterly: A Mag of Early American History (1961): 196-210. in JSTOR
  49. ^ Robert L. Ivie, "The metaphor of force in prowar discourse: The case of 1812." Quarterly Journal of Speech 68#iii (1982) pp: 240-253.
  50. ^ Bradford Perkins, The causes of the State of war of 1812: National accolade or national interest? (1962).
  51. ^ Spencer Tucker and Frank T. Reuter, Injured Accolade: The Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, 22 June 1807 (Naval Institute Press, 1996)
  52. ^ Encounter also Jonathon Hooks, "Redeemed Honor: The President‐Little Chugalug Affair and the Coming of the War of 1812." Historian 74.1 (2012): 1-24 online.
  53. ^ William Barlow and David O. Powell. "Congressman Ezekiel Bacon of Massachusetts and the Coming of the War of 1812." Historical Periodical of Massachusetts 6#two (1978): 28.
  54. ^ William R. Barlow, "Ohio's Congressmen and the War of 1812." Ohio History 72 (1963): 175-94.
  55. ^ Victor Sapio, Pennsylvania and the War of 1812 (University Press of Kentucky, 2015)
  56. ^ Martin Kaufman, "War Sentiment in Western Pennsylvania: 1812." Pennsylvania History (1964): 436-448.
  57. ^ William A. Walker, "Martial Sons: Tennessee Enthusiasm for the War of 1812." Tennessee Historical Quarterly 20.1 (1961): 20+
  58. ^ Edwin M. Gaines, "The Chesapeake Affair: Virginians Mobilize to Defend National Honor." The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography (1956): 131-142.
  59. ^ William Barlow, "The Coming of the War of 1812 in Michigan Territory." Michigan History 53 (1969): 91-107.
  60. ^ James L. Roark; Patricia Cline Cohen; et al. (2011). Understanding the American Promise. p. 259.
  61. ^ James H. Ellis (2009). A Ruinous and Unhappy War: New England and the State of war of 1812. Algora Publishing. pp. 75–76.
  62. ^ Lance Banning (1980). The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology. Cornell Upwards. p. 295.
  63. ^ J.C.A. Stagg, The war of 1812: Conflict for a Continent (2012) p. 6.
  64. ^ Horsman (1962) p. 266
  65. ^ Hickey (1989) p. nineteen
  66. ^ Hickey, p. 22; Horsman, p. 188.
  67. ^ Paul Langford, Mod British Foreign Policy: The Eighteenth Century: 1688-1815 (1976) p 228
  68. ^ Journal of the Senate of the United states of America, 1789–1873

Sources [edit]

  • Adams, Henry. History of the The states during the Administrations of James Madison (v vol 1890–91; 2 vol Library of America, 1986). ISBN 0-940450-35-6 Table of contents, the archetype political-diplomatic history
  • Benn, Carl. The War of 1812 (2003).
  • Brown, Roger H. The Republic in Peril: 1812 (1964). on American politics
  • Burt, Alfred L. The United States, Great Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace afterward the War of 1812. (1940)
  • Goodman, Warren H. "The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations," Mississippi Valley Historical Review (1941)28#i pp 171–86. in JSTOR
  • Hacker, Louis M. "Western Country Hunger and the War of 1812," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, (1924), ten#3 pp 365–95. in JSTOR
  • Heidler, Donald & J, (eds) Encyclopedia of the State of war of 1812 (2004) articles by 70 scholars from several countries
  • Hickey, Donald. The State of war of 1812: A Forgotten Disharmonize. University of Illinois Press, 1989. ISBN 0-252-06059-8, past leading American scholar
  • Hickey, Donald R. Don't Surrender the Send! Myths of the War of 1812. (2006) ISBN 0-252-03179-2
  • Hickey, Donald R. ed. The State of war of 1812 : writings from America'south second war of independence (2013), primary sources online gratis to borrow
  • Horsman, Reginald. The Causes of the War of 1812 (1962).
  • Kaplan, Lawrence S. "France and Madison'south Decision for War 1812," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 50, No. 4. (Mar., 1964), pp. 652–671. in JSTOR
  • Maass, Richard Due west. "'Difficult to Relinquish Territory Which Had Been Conquered': Expansionism and the War of 1812," Diplomatic History (Jan 2015) 39#one pp 70–97 doi: ten.1093/dh/dht132
  • Perkins, Bradford. Prologue to war: England and the United States, 1805–1812 (1961) total text online costless, detailed diplomatic history past American scholar
  • Perkins, Bradford. Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812·1823 (1964) excerpt; online review
  • Perkins, Bradford. (1962). The causes of the State of war of 1812. National honor or national involvement?" online free to borrow
  • Pratt, Julius W. A History of United States Foreign Policy (1955)
  • Pratt, Julius Westward. (1925b.) Expansionists of 1812
  • Pratt, Julius W. "Western War Aims in the War of 1812," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 12 (June, 1925), 36–l. in JSTOR
  • Risjord, Norman K. "1812: Conservatives, War Hawks, and the Nation'south Accolade," William and Mary Quarterly, eighteen#2 ( 1961), 196–210. in JSTOR
  • Smelser, Marshall. The Democratic Republic 1801–1815 (1968) general survey of American politics & diplomacy
  • Stagg, John C. A. Mr. Madison's State of war: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American republic, 1783–1830. (1983), major overview (by New Zealand scholar)
  • Stagg, John C. A. "James Madison and the 'Malcontents': The Political Origins of the War of 1812," William and Mary Quarterly (Oct., 1976) in JSTOR
  • Stagg, John C. A. "James Madison and the Coercion of Britain: Canada, the West Indies, and the War of 1812," in The William and Mary Quarterly (Jan., 1981) in JSTOR
  • Steel, Anthony. "Anthony Merry and the Anglo-American Dispute about Impressment, 1803-6." Cambridge Historical Periodical 9#3 (1949): 331-51 online.
  • Taylor, Alan. The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies (2010)
  • Taylor, George Rogers, ed. The State of war of 1812: Past Justifications and Present Interpretations (1963) online free
  • Trautsch, Jasper Chiliad. "The Causes of the War of 1812: 200 Years of Contend," Periodical of Military History (Jan 2013) 77#1 pp 273–293
  • Updyke, Frank A. The diplomacy of the War of 1812 (1915) online costless

External links [edit]

  • Reading list on the Causes of the War of 1812 compiled by the U.s. Army Center of War machine History

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origins_of_the_War_of_1812

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